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
Abstract
The literature reviewed suggests thatNetwork Intrusion Systems (NIDS) are valuable tools for the
detectionofmalicious behaviour in network environments.NIDSprovidealerts and the trigger for
rapid responses to attacks. Our previous research had shown that NIDS performance in wireless
networkshadawidevariationunderdifferentworkloads.Inthisresearchwechosewirednetworks
andaskedthequestion:WhatistheevidentialvalueofNIDS?ThreedifferentNIDSweretestedunder
two different attacks andwith six different packet rates. The resultswere alarming. As thework
loadingincreasedtheNIDSdetectioncapabilityfellrapidlyandasthecomplexityofattackincreased
theNIDSdetectioncapabilityfellmorequickly.WeconcludethatNIDShaveweakevidentialvaluefor
eithersystemimprovementorlegaladmissibility.

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INTRODUCTION
IntrusionDetection systems are the tools that process, identify and respond tomalicious activity
targeted at information and networking resources (Lokhande, Bhaskarwar, Bhaskarwar, &
Chidrawar,2012). Ingeneral IDSsare categorized into the two types;network intrusiondetection
systems (NIDS) and hostbased IDS. A NIDS monitors packets on the network and attempts to
discover ifahacker istryingtobreakintoasystem(Maier,Sommer,Dreger,Feldmann,Paxson,&
Schneider, 2008). A typical example is a system that watches a large number of TCP connection
requests (SYN) for many different ports on a target machine, thus discovering if someone is
attemptingaTCPportscan.Thistechnologyhasbeenmadetocompareusers’actionagainstknown
attack scenariosandbeable topredictand indicate suspiciousbehaviour.Thereare two typesof
NIDS and each one has different mechanisms from the others. These types are: Anomalybased
detectionalsoknownasbehaviourbaseddetectionthatworkstodetectthebehaviourthat isnot
normalorisnotcompatiblewithnormalbehaviour.TheoreticallythistypeofIDSsrequiresawhole
listofnormalbehaviouractions.However,insomeenvironmentsthiscanworkbecausethenormal
behaviouractionsarelimited(Ren,2006).Themodelisconsideredtobedangerousbecauseitmight
haveunacceptablebehaviourlistedwithinthetrainingdataanditwillbeacceptedlaterasnormal
behaviour.ThesecondoneisSignaturebaseddetectionalsoknownasmisusebaseddetection.This
typeusesthesignatureofknownmaliciousactivities.Italsoworksbyaddingawholelistofknown
maliciousactionsormisusesignatures(Saari&Jantan,2011).Althoughthereareahugenumberof
malicious actions, it is impossible to put all these activities on a list and keep it manageable.
Therefore,thereareonlyalimitednumberofactionsignaturesaddedtothelistandthelimitation
dependson threeactivities: unauthorizedmodification, unauthorizedaccess anddenial of service
(Pomeroy&Tan,2011).

NIDSASSOURCESOFEVIDENCE
Thereisawidearrayofintrusiondetectionsystemsthatarespecificallydesignedforwirednetworks
(Sommer, 1999; Nikkel, 2005). These systems and/or products are available in two types; either
opensourcesoftwareorcommercialonesandallofthemareaddressingarangeoforganizational
security goals and considerations. Snort is one of the most popular deployed systems in most
network security environments and it is considered to have a huge dataset of signatures for
malicious activities. It searches for very specific content in the network stream and reports each
instanceofaparticularsignature.Snort’smodulardesignallowsdeveloperstocreateandaddextra
features into the core detection engine.  However, snort may have some disadvantages such as
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dropping packets when the process network rate is at 100200 megabytes per second before
reaching the processing limit of a single CPU because the Snort engine is designed toworkwith
singlethreadedmultistage units. Research reports have compared Snort with other IDS such as
Suricata and BroIDS that offer different features and capabilities. They concluded that Suricata’s
multithreaded architecture requires more memory and CPU resources than Snort but it can
accommodatemanynetworkinstanceswithnoneedtousemultipleinstances.Ontheotherhand,
snort isefficientbutwith limitedability tomeasuremorethan200300Mbpsnetworkbandwidth
perinstance(Saari&Jantan,2011).Bothsystemswereobservedtomissseveralcommonmalicious
packets. BroIDS is slightly different in that it usesmore sophisticated signatures bymeans of its
policy language. It can analyse network traffic at a much higherlevel of abstraction, and has
powerful facilities for storing information about past activity and incorporating it into analysis of
newactivitywhichmeans it isbetter for forensics. IDScanbeselected forcontext,used together
andoptimisedforpurpose.

Numerouspapers havebeenpublished suggesting thatNIDS canbeused as sources of evidence;
however,eachreferenceacknowledgesthatthereisagapbetweenthepurposesofNIDSsandthe
needsofthelegalsystem(Casey,2004).Thisgapdoesn’tonlylackatafunctionalandapurposive
level, but also the preservation and completeness of evidencemay be insufficient or incomplete.
Hence consideration of embedding NIDS in support systems and improving NIDS capability are
potential solutions. Some recent intrusion detection systems are capable of recording malicious
commands including source and distinct network addresses, protocol used, event characteristics
suchastimeanddateandfurtherrelatedinformationsuchasusernameandfilenameappliedwithin
the application. These innovations are a move in the required direction for better evidence
collection.

Thepublishedworksontheuseofusingintrusiondetectionsystemsfornetworkforensicspurposes
outline the analytic potential for attacks, duration accounting of the exploit and recording the
methods applied during the attack (Saari& Jantan, 2011; Kaur& Kaur, 2012). These descriptions
includelogsysteminformationgathering,adaptivecaptureofnetworktraffic,storingthehistorical
network misuse patterns and active or automated responses for investigational forensics. A
suggested investigatory system contains four elements which are a forensics server, network
forensicsagents,networkmonitors,andnetworkinvestigatorsoftware(Reith,Carr&Gunsch,2002).
Another simple framework for distributed forensics has an integrated platform for automatic
evidence collection and efficient data storage, and matching known attribution methods against
attacks. Thismodelhasproxyandagentarchitectures that collect, stores,processesandanalyses
forensic information. One advantage is automatic evidence collection and quick responses to
networkattacks.Othersystemsprovideacombinationofagenttheoriesandartificialintelligenceto
dynamically assure evidence retention and extraction capabilities. The systems have different
elements tostoredata intheforensicsserverandcollect thedata fromforensicagents,detector
agents and responseagents. The detectoragent, forensicsagent and responseagentsmanage to
capture realtimenetworkdata,match themwith intrusionbehaviourand thensend themto the
forensics–agent.Theforensicsagenthelpstocollectthedigitalevidence,createadigitalsignature
andthentransmittheevidencetotheforensicserver.Theforensicserverplaysaroleinanalysing
theevidenceandreplayingtheattackprocedureinordertocreateaquickresponsetoattacks(Pilli,
Joshi,&Niyogi,2010).

THERESEARCHQUESTIONS
TestingofNIDSinwirelessnetworksshowedthatperformanceswererelatedtoworkloadingsand
that generally inadequate evidence was stored for forensic purposes (Laurenson, 2010). These
findings and the literature reviewed suggest that there are issues and problems associated with
usingNIDSforevidentialpurposes.Consequentlythemainresearchquestionwasdefinedas:What
istheevidentialvalueofaNIDS?

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Laurenson’s (2010) researchwasconducted inawirelessnetwork sowe resolved thevariationof
testinghisfindingsinawirednetwork.AlsohechosetotestNIDSunderincreasingworkloads.We
resolvedtodothesamebutinadditiontoconsiderthecomplexityvariableasapotentialinfluence
on performance. Themotivation for researching tool complexity came from the literature on the
architecturesofdifferentNIDSandtheircapabilities.Henceweaskedsetofsubquestionstotease
outthemainquestionintheproblemcontext:

(1)Whatisthenumberofpacketslost?
(2)Whatistheretentionofeventdata?
(3)WhatcomplexitycanaNIDScopewith?
(4)Whatarethesystemcosts?
(5)Whatistheviabilityoftheevidenceforcompliancewithlegalexpectations?

Testingsubquestions(1)to(4)reliesonstresstestingandcountdata.Subquestion(5)howeverhas
legalcomplexityandrequiresthespecificationofadmissibilitycriteria.Consequentlywechosethe
Daubert criteria (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard) to be a fair representation and
generalisationofthegroundsonwhichacourtmayacceptevidence.Thecriteriaare:

1. Empirical testing: whether the theory or technique is falsifiable, refutable, and/or
testable.
2. Whetherithasbeensubjectedtopeerreviewandpublication.
3. Theknownorpotentialerrorrate.
4. Theexistenceandmaintenanceofstandardsandcontrolsconcerningitsoperation.
5. The degree to which the theory and technique is generally accepted by a relevant
scientificcommunity.

THERESEARCHDESIGN
NIDS are principally software assets thatmanage adverse events andmaintain the system status
quo. Inouranalysisof literaturenoneaddressedtheevidential issueofprosecutingoffendersand
henceliftingthesystemdefencetoalevelofhumanaccountability.Thiswouldnotbethecaseifa
retailshopwasbrokenintoanddamagesdone.Thepolicewouldbecalledandevidencecollectedto
identify theoffenders.The retail shopownerswouldalso reviewthesecuritymeasuresandmake
anysuitableadjustments.TousitseemedunusualthatNIDSwithevidentialcapabilitiescouldnotbe
liftedtothestatusofprosecutionevidence.Tothisendwedesignedanumberofteststoseehow
goodNIDSwereatcollectingprosecutionevidenceandwhatelementsrequiredimprovement.Our
testbed is illustrated inFigure1below.The testbedhad facilities togeneratepacketsatdifferent
controlledrates,asimulatedattackerwhocouldlaunchCrosssitescriptingattacksandSQLinjection
attacks,apacketsnifferattherouter,afirewall,alocationtoplacethedifferentNIDSfortestingand
forensicandwebserverstorespectivelycollectallpacketsandtoprovidetargetservices.


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
Figure1.TheTestbedArchitecture

The researchproceeded bybenchmarking the systemat status zerowhere everythingwas set to
zerocapability.Thesystemwasthenpoweredupandthefunctionalityofeachcomponentchecked.
Thetestingstartedbysettingthepacketratevalueandbylaunchingoneattack.Oncethedatawas
collectedthenthenextpacketratewassetandrununtilthemaximumvalueof100Mbs.Therates
startedatanarbitrary.4Mbsandthenweresteppedat20Mbsacross5intervals.Theprocedurewas
repeatedforthesecondattacktype.Oncecompletedthesystemwasreturnedtotheoriginalzero
state, a different NIDSmounted and the procedures repeated again until all the NIDS had been
tested.

THERESULTS
TheresultsofourtestingofthreeNIDSprovidedanswerstoeachofthesubquestions.Inthefirst
instance(1)thenumberofpacketsdroppedbytheNIDSincreasedwiththeworkload(seefigure2).
Snortshowedgreatestincreaseindroppedpacketsfrom30%at30Mbsto80%at100Mbs.BroIDS
andSuricatadroppedsomepacketsbutremainedunder10%forthewholeexperiment.EachNIDS
retainednodataunlesstheoptionswereconfiguredtodothis (2). Inthetestbedarchitecturethe
forensic server retained all evidence generated by the configured NIDS plus all traffic passing
through thenetwork.BroIDSandSuricatadeliveredmoreevidence thanSnortasbothhadmore
options and dropped fewer packets.  The tests for complexity (3) showed variable performance
betweentheNIDS(seefigure3).Figure3showstheresultsofthecrosssitescriptingattack–the
mostcomplexattack.Fourattacksweremadeateachworkload.At10MbsonlyBroIDSdetectedall
attacks.At100MbsnoneoftheNIDSdetectedanyattacks.Snorthadthelowestperformanceand
Suricataperformedbetter.TheSQLinjectionattackhadlesscomplexitythanthecrosssitescripting
attacksbuttheresultsshowedasimilarpattern.EachNIDSmaintainedahigherdetectionratebut
all fell to zeroby 100Mbs. The system costs (4) in termsof CPUusage andmemory requirement
wereasexpected(seefigure4).AsapercentageofCPUusageBroIDSandSuricatawerebothmore
costly. These costs were expected because the NIDS with higher level abstractions also require
greater computational power and storage services. Snort is a long established product that was
designedforminimalrequirementsandasaconsequenceis ineffectiveundercomplexattacksand
heavyworkloads.However it is economical in termsof its cost to the systemandpresents a low
overhead. Subquestion (5) required higher level analysis to resolve the relationship between the
dataandtheDaubertcriteria.

The scenario is that a NIDS is being used to collect evidence of a system attack. Under the first
Daubertcriteriatheevidenceisnotrepeatablebecausethedatasetsareincompleteandeachtrial
forempiricaltestingisauniqueevent.Undercriteria2.,theuseofNIDSforcollectingevidencehave
been subject topeer reviewandpublicationsbut thesepublications (as referencedabove) report
problemswiththeintegrityandconsistencyoftheevidenceindifferentconditions.Undercriteria3.,
thepotentialerrorratesarenottabulatedbutcanbeestablishedinpretests.Undercriteria4.,NIDS
areusedinnetworksystemsthatcanbecertifiedandheldincontrolbystandardsandrequirements
fortheoperationaluse.Undercriteria5.,thetheory,theuseandtheacceptanceofNIDSisgenerally
acceptedintheITsecuritycommunity.

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

Figure2.Droppedpacketpercentage



Figure3.CrossSiteScriptingAttackDetection(4intotalforeachNIDS)

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







Figure4.NIDSCostsinPercentageofavailableCPU

DISCUSSION





Figure4.CPUutilization(Maximum4x100%)

DISCUSSION
The results of this research are disturbing. The literature reviewed suggested that NIDS were
valuable assets for network security and forensic investigation. The literature also indicated
weaknessesinNIDSthatcanaffecteffectivenessandourresultsconfirmLaurenson’s(2010)general
performance concerns found in wireless networks. NIDS act as detection systems and trigger
responsesystemstoprotectassets.Inadditionlogfilesarekept(whenconfigured)sothatrecords
of events are retained. However, our research shows that a NIDS only performs its required
functionalityinparticularconditions.Whencomplexattackshappenduringheavyworkloadperiods
mostNIDSfailtoperform.Theimplicationsofthisimpactthetrustusersmayhaveandthedegreeof
assurancethatmaybegiventoanynetworksystemprotectedbyNIDS.

Themainresearchquestionasked:WhatistheevidentialvalueofNIDS?Therearetwopartsinthe
answertothequestion.EvidencefromNIDShasfromtheliteraturereviewedprincipallyconcerned
evidence of an attack that can be made available from the system log files. The evidence is
consequently used in a forensic post event fashion to better prepare and to prevent a similar
occurrence.However,contrarytothestrongassertionsmadeintheliteraturethepopularNIDSwe
testedandundertheconditionsfailedtoperformasrequired.Theimplicationsofourfindingsare
both for alerts and responses and for post mortem actions. The data showed that under some
conditions 100% of the attacks passed unreported.  A normal system is expected to perform at
100MbsandagainstwidelyavailableandusedattacksandyettheNIDStestedfailed.Systempost
mortemimprovementbasedonsuchincompletedatasetscanonlybeinadequatefordefence.SQL
injectionattackshavebeenusedonbusinessestoalterstockpricesandtomakelegitimatesalesat
incorrect transaction points; effectively taking $1000s from stores. Similarly Cross Site scripting
attackshavebeenusedagainstbankstofuzzonlinebankingformsandtosteal$1000s.Thecostto
businessesofmissingoneoftheseattacksishigh;andyetourstudyshowsthat100%oftheattacks
can be missed under normal network working conditions. The results raise serious concerns for
networksecurityandtheassuranceofassetprotection.
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
The second part of the question concerned the availability and the quality of evidence for
prosecutingoffenders.Asmentionedabovethisistheusualexpectationwheredamagesorthefthas
occurred to a business or the systems. We used the Daubert criteria to assess the potential
admissibilityoftheevidencetocourt. Assessmentofthefirstcriteriasuggestedthatrepeatability
andthe incompletedatasetsareaproblem.Criteria2hasbeensatisfiedbut thetestreportscite
limitations and exceptions when using NIDS for collecting evidence. Criteria 3 has again been
satisfiedbuttheerrorratesrequirescrutinyagainstandbenchmarkingagainstacceptableassurance
scales.Criteria4and5aresatisfied.NIDSevidencemaybeadmissibletoacourtof lawbutunder
crossexaminationmanyquestionscanbeasked.Anexpertwitnessmaybe justified inpresenting
such findings in the reportbasedon thestrengthof the investigationmethodology.However, the
gapsandexceptionsexistentintheprimaryevidencecollectionwillrequirecollaborativeevidences
fromother sources to explain theNIDS contribution. A further andmore challenging question is:
Whyiscriteria5satisfiedintheITsecuritycommunity?Fromtheliteraturerevieweditiseasytosee
that the strong case is thatNIDSare effective andefficient fordetectionand relianton for rapid
response defence. The weaker case made in the literature is for conditions on performance. To
simply explain the discrepancies as a cost benefit tradeoff overlooks the weighted problem of
reputationand credibility.Abrandmay financially accommodatemany successfulattacks through
spreading financial assurance but poor protective performance weakens customer appreciation.
Similarlysuccessfulcriminalswhoroamunchallengedwillcontinuetooffendandharmsystems.

CONCLUSION
OurfindingssuggestthatNIDSperformanceforgeneratingattackalertsvariesgreatlywithregardto
the number of packets passing through the network and also the complexity of attacks. The
variabilityinperformanceraisesseriousissuesregardingthevalueofevidencecollectedbyNIDS.A
simpleDDOSattackwhennotmuchishappeningonanetworkcanbereadilyalertedbutinnormal
busydayandwithacomplexattacktheNIDSisoflittleuse.Disturbinglytheresultsindicatethatan
engineer hoping to protect informationassets and/or a computing asset requiresmore than fully
functionalNIDS.Similarly,evidencecollectedbyNIDSmayfallshortofadmissibilityorfacearaftof
challengesinacourtroomifoffendersaretobeprosecuted.Wetakeissuewiththeassumptionthat
NIDScanprovidetrustworthyevidence.Withoutconsiderationofthemanyvariablesimpactingthe
performanceofaNIDSunqualifiedstatementsoffactcannotbemade.Ourinvestigationshowsthat
NIDScannotactaloneinprotectingasystemandthatotherevidencewouldalsoberequiredbefore
admissibility.

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